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 1 Introduction and context 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
When we think about auctions, fashionable e-commerce websites Auctions spring to mind. The 
popularity of auctions has encouraged the growth of auction support software for both buyers and 
sellers. These auctions usually involve a site where a seller posts items or services for sale and many 
bidders attempt to buy them. But in reverse auctions, one buyer usually hosts a site listing items or 
services it needs and asks many sellers to bid on the prices. 
However, for all public telecommunications services, whether in so-called deregulated countries or in 
the remaining regulated ones, there is no auctioning of telecommunications service prices ;there are at 
best business contracts embodied in service level agreements (SLAs) between a service user and each 
of its mobile service operator suppliers or value-added service suppliers ,and some small 
clearinghouses for bandwidth or some SMS capacity provided as a business service .  
Operators between themselves, if they have service level agreements (SLAs) may want to auction off 
spare capacity for commodity capabilities such as bandwidth, emergency frequency spectrum, and 
possibly network management services. This auctioning is mostly telephone auctioning within a club, 
and only rarely have tools been developed for bandwidth pricing and auctioning (Pau (1999) )  .The 
difficulty is that the spare capacity is dynamic, and has itself different costing basis ,and furthermore 
that there are high technical demands as to technical qualification of SLA quality-of-service attributes 
and their verification at provisioning time .  
 
Remain so far some unregulated public value-added services, where regulators or practices would not 
be limiting factors. In this space, few services have enough volume and business value to warrant inter-
operator, or enterprise auctioning processes. And most depend then on content or on human assistance 
(inquiry information, reverse directory information, etc ...).  
 
However, the class of mobile messaging (SMS, EMS and MMS) is a reasonable candidate for reverse 
auctions , as demand for better pricing terms than public operator mobile messaging tariffs is huge, as 
many business processes or services demand mobile messaging as a channel ,and finally as there are 
less technical hurdles to be resolved . 
 
Today, SMSs are short standardized messages with ASCII text only, with a limited number of 
characters, defined as part of most 2G standards (GSM, CDMA, DAMPS, PDC), and offered as 
services by public mobile operators. However, SMS services are also deregulated, so a value-added 
service provider (VASP) or value added resellers (VARS) created under the provisions of Virtual 
Mobile Operators regulation (EU) could get bids from operators to deliver bulk SMSes to e.g. 
company VPNs, or could serve as a market maker between enterprises and operators. By the end of 
2001, SMS traffic was about 40 Billion SMS messages/month, growing at about 40 %/year. 
 
 2
 The SMSs would also be improved to cater to the Enhanced Messaging Service (EMS) standard under 
3GPP, where multimedia attachments and other fonts would be included. EMS is a standardized 
instance of Multimedia Messaging MMS. 
 
MMS is an emerging messaging standard and is  specified  by 3GPP , and in use with a number of 
early 3G operators (3GPP1 compliant ).MMS is an evolution of traditional messaging services but goes 
beyond simple text and voice messaging and will allow users to send and receive messages in a whole 
new array of media types e.g. text, audio, images and eventually video. MMS messages can be sent 
between mobile terminals, between a mobile terminal and server or server initiated push to a mobile 
terminal. 
 
Like SMS, EMS & MMS may be delivered in pre-paid mode, contract or non-contract based.  EMS 
may be delivered only to a network cell, or a group of cells. There is intended to be a special market for 
Mobile Instant Messages. 
 
 
1.2 Scope of the paper 
 
The scope of the paper is to establish the characteristics and benefits of a bulk-SMS/MMS reverse 
multi-attribute auction by developing two prototypes of a single-side 3-dimensional attribute  reverse 
auction to trade bulk-SMS and MMS. 
 
The objective of this paper  can be divided into three goals: 
- To develop a conceptual model and establish the characteristics of the Mobile Messaging Bulk  
Reverse auction ,as supported by a prototype . 
- Test the performance of a multiple round auction in order to determine what kind of 3-
dimensional  auction will lead to Pareto Optimality and Allocative Efficiency in trading bulk-
SMS/MMS. 
- Define further fields of research for using reverse auctions in trading mobile messaging. 
 
1.3 Plan of this paper 
 
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 will describe the theoretical background of e-
auctions. Not only we will focus on the various (reverse) e-auction aspects, but also a look into todays 
world of Telecommunication auctions will be given in order to deploy under which circumstances 
(reverse) auctions are successful (in telecommunications). In section three the conceptual model 
describes the multiple hypothesis to test and the methods to tests these hypothesis. The basis of the 
research project is articulated. Section four investigates the mobile messaging market, with special 
interest into the market of Bulk-SMS in order to characterize what the roles of the stakeholders in the 
e-auction are. After the fields of e-auctions and mobile messaging are discussed, the prototype will be 
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developed in section five. First the characteristics and parameters of the English and Multiple round 
auctions will be described. Consecutive the prototypes are built and described. In section 6 the results 
of the laboratory experiments are analyzed, in order to observe what kind of 3-dimension e-auction will 
lead to Pareto Optimality and Allocative Efficiency in trading bulk-SMS/MMS. After the auction is 
tested in a laboratory, in section 7 an insight into the future will be given by developing future 
scenarios for trading mobile messaging in the telecom sector. Finally, in section eight conclusions, 
limitations and further research are formulated. 
 
2. Theoretical framework for Mobile Messaging bulk auctions 
 
2.1 Definitions 
- e-auction is defined as a web enabled automated auction were the communication takes place via the 
Internet.  
-single-side indicates that the only one party will place bids. 
-reverse indicates that in the auction the competition takes place between the sellers instead of the 
buyers. The sellers, e.g. networks operators or VARS, are actually placing the bids at the request of the 
buyers. 
-multi-dimensional indicates that multiple parameters will determine the winner of a contract. Not only 
price but also other variable quality-of-service (QoS) parameters like security and quantity are part of 
the bid in the SMS auction. Other fixed variables in the SMS auction are delay and size. In the MMS 
auction the variable dimensions are formed by size, quantity and price. Fixed variables in the MMS 
auction are security and delay. 
-bulk-SMS/MMS is defined as usage of SMS/MMS in bulk by a single buyer for the following main 
areas: Messaging, Mobile Commerce, Information Services, Advertisement , Entertainment, Customer 
Relationship Management, Mobile Marketing , Field Support ,Work force management , etc...    
-Pareto Optimality in a multidimensional auction means having a winning bid from which no mutually 
beneficial bids exist (i.e. for the bid taker and that particular bidder). Note that this not necessarily 
means that the bid takers utility is maximized. 
-Allocative Efficiency defines whether the winning bid is made by the most efficient bidder. Or is there 
a bidder who could make a feasible bid (feasible for both parties) that would improve the bid takers 
utility? The latter would not be efficient. 
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 2.2 Theoretical background e-auctions 
 
2.2.1 Electronic Markets 
Markets play a central role in the economy, facilitating the exchange of information, goods and 
payments. In this process, they create economic value for buyers, sellers, market intermediaries and for 
society at large. This process is a form of coordinating the flow of materials or services through 
adjacent steps in the value added chain. Coordinating such a value chain can be done in two basic 
mechanisms: markets and hierarchies1. Markets coordinate the process through the dynamic process of 
supply and demand. Market forces determine the sales-attributes (design, price, delivery and quantity). 
The buyers choose the optimal of these attributes in such a transaction. This form is widely used among 
different individuals and firms. Hierarchies in contrast, coordinate the flow of materials trough adjacent 
steps by controlling and directing it at a higher level within the managerial hierarchy. Managerial 
decisions, not the interaction of the sales-attributes, determine how design, price, delivery and quantity 
are related when products from one step in the value chain are procured for the next step. The 
transactions costs is the main criterion to measures the performance of the mechanisms. Hierarchies 
were widely used for coordinating the value chain since the transaction cost were lower then in a 
market form. By using various information technologies in an electronic market, the transaction costs 
have fundamentally decreased. Therefore, Malone predicts a substantial change towards markets as a 
form of coordination.  Furthermore, a product should have characteristics which are easily  described in 
order to be traded electronically. 
 
Thus a major impact of the electronic market systems is that they typically reduce the search costs 
buyers must pay to obtain information about the prices and product offerings in the market. Bakos2 
identifies certain other characteristics as relevant to a strategic analysis of these systems, namely 
network externalities, technology uncertainty, switching costs, and economies of scale and scope. 
Recent years have seen this increase in the role of information technology in markets. Both in 
traditional markets and in the emergence of electronic marketplaces, such as the Internet-based 
auctions.  
 
In order to analyze a market, Bakos claims that markets have three main functions: 
- Matching buyers and sellers 
- Facilitating the exchange of information, goods, services and payments associated with 
markets transactions 
- Providing an institutional infrastructure, such as a legal and regulatory framework 
2.2.2 e-Auction 
                                                          
1 Malone, T., Yates, J., Benjamin, R., (1987), Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies, 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 30, no. 6, June 1987 
2 Bakos, J. (1991), A strategic Analysis of Electronic Marketplaces, MIS Quarterly, September 1991, 
pp. 295-310 
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Another specific form of an electronic market is the electronic auction.  An auction is a market 
institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids 
from the market participants.  
 
Online (e) auctions differ from manual auctions in several ways. First, the speed of information in e-
auctions is rapid, with instant communication and feedback. Second, the cost of contact among bidders 
is greatly reduced via the use of a knowledgeable intermediary, a third party auctioneer who introduces 
qualified suppliers to the buyers and vice versa,  and manages the trade-processes. Also geographic and 
temporal convenience is increased, as asynchronous bidding is possible and bidders are able to 
participate from all over the world. Third, e-auctions represent a significant compression in negotiation 
time and preparation. Finally, the e-auction can preserve bidder anonymity, by not allowing the 
participants in the auction to know their identity or number of participants in the auction process. 
 
2.2.3 Type of auctions 
 
According to Van Heck and Vervest  three types of web-based auctions can be distinguished. In web-
based sales auctions one seller offers to as many buyers as allowed into the auction. In a web-based 
procurement auction one buyer tenders his procurement needs via the web-auction. In this type of 
auction, multi criteria like price, quality, delivery time are part of the bid. In the last auction type, web-
based many-to-many auctions, many suppliers offer to many potential buyers.
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 2.2.4 Basic auction mechanisms 
 
Several mechanisms are developed to coordinate the bidding processes. Four basic types of auctions 
are widely used and analyzed: the ascending-bid auction (also called the open, oral or English auction), 
the descending-bid auction (used in the sale of flowers in the Netherlands and so called the Dutch 
auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction (also called the 
Vickrey auction). 
 
 Buyers 
 One Many
 
 
Negotiations 
using EDI 
Web-based 
sales auctionsOne  
Sellers  
 
Web-based 
procurement 
auctions 
Web-based 
many-to-many 
auctions 
 Many 
 
 
 Figure 1 The use of auctions in electronic commerce 
 
English auction 
In the ascending auction, the price is successively raised until one bidder remains, and that bidder wins 
the object at the final price. This auction can be run by having the seller announce prices, or by having 
the bidders call out prices themselves, or by having bids submitted electronically with the best current 
bid posted. In the model most commonly used by auction theorists the price rises continuously while 
bidders gradually quit the auction. Bidders observe when their competitors quit, and once someone 
quits, she is not left in. There is no possibility for one bidder to pre-empt the process by making  a large 
jump-bid.  
 
There are two options in which an English auction can end. This can be after a pre-defined (fixed) point 
in time or at a moment where after there havent been any bids for a certain time. Ending an English 
auction on a pre-defined point in time has as main advantage that the duration of the auction is fixed. 
The bidders know on forehand how long they have to attend at the auction. On the other hand it 
enhances the danger of sniping3. Bidders could make a bid just before the ending of the auction, cause 
of the time-constraint the other bidders couldnt react to this bid. When the other option is used, a bid is 
accepted when there havent been any bids for a  certain time (once, twicesold). The major 
disadvantage of this systems is that beforehand the duration of the auction is unknown. 
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3 Lucking-Reiley, D., (1999), Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?, 
Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville 
 Dutch auction 
The descending Dutch auction works exactly in the opposite way of the English auction: the auctioneer 
starts at a very high price, and then lowers the price continuously. The first bidder who calls out that 
she will accept the current price wins the object at that price. The advantage of this auction mechanism 
is the enormous speed in which an auction can be run. Hence the us of this auction mechanism in the 
case of  perishable goods or auctions whereby in a short time the buyer would like to buy a lot of 
different products. 
 
First-price sealed-bid 
In the first-price sealed-bid auction each bidder independently submits a single bid, without seeing 
others bids, and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. The winners pays her bid 
(that is, the price is the highest or first price bid). This type of auction is mainly used in tenders. There 
is a possibility to run this auction over several rounds where after every round the winner is announced. 
Bidders have the possibility to make a new bid. Compared to the Dutch and English auction the main 
difference is the information structure. Bidders have to make their bids (almost) without information of 
the other bidders bids. 
 
Second-price sealed-bid 
In the second-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently submits a single bid, without seeing 
others bids, and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. However, the price she 
pays is the second-highest bidders bid, or second price. This auction is sometimes called a Vickrey 
auction after William Vickrey, who wrote the seminal paper on the auctions4. According to Vikcrey 
this type of auction delivers the same outcome for the seller as the English auction time; the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem. 
 
Besides these four key-auction mechanisms there are many alternative mechanisms developed. These 
are all based on the four key-auction mechanisms and only differ in secondarily characteristics. These 
are often developed for specialized markets or situations. 
 
 
2.2.5 Relative performance of auction mechanisms 
 
Nobel price winner Vickrey5 studied three of the basic auction mechanisms: the English auction, the 
Dutch auction and the Sealed bid auction. Vickrey shows that under certain conditions: 
• The strategically equivalence of the English and the Second-price auction. 
                                                          
4 Strecker, S., (2001), Electronic Negotiations, A memo on Taxonomy, Terminology and an 
Introduction to Literature, Information Management and Systems, University Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe 
5 Vickrey, W. (1961), Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of 
Finance, 16, 8-37 
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• The strategically equivalence of the Dutch and First-price auction.  
• All four basic auction mechanisms lead to Pareto efficiency allocation and generate the same 
expected value. 
• Given that bidders are risk-averse, Dutch auctions generate a higher expected value than an 
English auction. 
 
So according to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem the four basic auction types generate the same 
expected value for the sellers in the Nash-equilibrium6.  The Nash-equilibrium describes a situation 
where none of the bidders can gain an advantage by changing of strategy, given an unchanged strategy 
of the other bidders. The choice for an specific auction mechanism has therefore no influence on the 
expected revenue of the bid-taker (seller).  
 
Furthermore, the article of Bulow and Klemperer compares traditional negotiating with auctioning. 
They were especially interested in the expected price formation, which learned that:  
- Normal auctions lead to a higher prices than negotiating 
- Reverse auctions lead to lower prices than negotiating 
In both cases the auction increases the competitiveness and transparency. In a normal auction this takes 
place among the buyers, in the reverse auction the increase takes place among the suppliers.  The 
increased competition among the buyers has a price gaining effect, where as the same competition 
between the suppliers has a decreasing effect on price.  
 
2.3 Reverse Auctions 
 
In a sales auction there are typically more potential buyers who have to compete among each other to 
finally close a deal with one sales party. In procurement auction on the contrary, competition takes 
place among the different sellers to eventually deliver to one buyer. This type of auction, where the 
competition takes place among the sellers, is called a reverse auction (also called tender of procurement 
auction). The idea behind this type of auction is to change the traditional seller-driven market into a 
buyer-driven market. This also means that the search costs of the buyer are transferred to the seller. 
 
A stimulus for the use of reverse auctions is the potential process savings associated with them. They 
typical purchasing process involving mailing request for proposals to potential buyers, followed by 
printed responses, manual reviews of the proposals and ongoing negotiations. The average length of 
this process is several weeks. An online reverse auction dramatically reduces the negotiation time, 
whereby the bidding can occur over a span of a few hours.  
 
The auctions mechanisms discussed in paragraph 2.2.4 are also suitable in a reverse auction. Some of 
their characteristics will slightly change, therefore they are again discussed separately.  
                                                          
6 Bulow, J., Klemperer, P., (1996), Auctions versus Negotiations, American Economic Review, 86, pp. 
180-194 
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 English auction 
When an English auction is reversed the price in the auction will keep dropping. The auction starts at 
a high price level where after the bidders can place their bid on a decreasing price, until there is one 
bidder left, the winner. This market form has the advantage that it reveals market information during 
the auction process. Hence, a seller who has made a mistake can still make a new bid in order to win 
the auction. The disadvantage of this type is besides the time needed to run this auction also the danger 
of sniping.   
 
Dutch auction 
A reverse Dutch auction is an auction whereby the price doesnt drop but rises, like a normal English 
auction. The auction starts at a low price level, the price automatically increases and the first bidder 
who bids is the winner and has sold his products. The other sellers have waited to long and wont sell 
to this buyer. This method has the advantage that it is quite fast. A drawback is the lack of market 
information during the auction. The information is revealed when the transaction is done, locking out 
any anticipations on the information. 
 
Sealed-bid 
In an sealed bid auction the bids are not made public. The multiple bidders bid to a certain lot against a 
certain price. The bidder with the best bid wins the contract. The reverse aspect doesnt really change 
the characteristics of these auction types. 
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 2.4 Multidimensional Auctions 
 
2.4.1 Multidimensional auction characteristics 
In most auctions only one variable is put up for auction, namely price. A well defined product with 
fixed characteristics is offered for sale. The only negotiable dimension is therefore price. However, in 
the reverse auction case, the bid-taker is much more likely to solicit bids that are based on more than 
just price alone. Bidders now would not submit a one-dimensional bid of just price, but instead submit 
a bid consisting of a vector of characteristics such as price, quantity, quality, delivery time and 
warranty. The multidimensional auction could also give answer to the problem of the dropping prices 
because of strong price-competition, which is negative for the sellers. Since the bid is not only made 
out of price, the other dimensions play a role which could have a price-gaining effect. This effect has 
advantages for both sellers (they could earn a better price for their product) and buyers. The bids will 
probably be more diverse and new combinations of the dimensions will occur which can better match 
the buyers demand.   
 
Little research is done about the use of the basic auction mechanisms in a multidimensional setting. 
Che looked at three different auction mechanisms (first priced sealed bid, second price sealed bid and 
second preferred offer) for two-dimensional auctions (on price and quality), based on actual practices at 
the US Department of Defense. He showed that under certain circumstances the three investigated 
mechanisms yield the same expected revenue and that in all circumstances, quality is either 
undervalued or overvalued from the buyers point of view. In his analysis, he assumed that the costs of 
the bidding firms were independent. Branco  extended Ches analysis by deriving an optimal auction 
mechanism for the more realistic case when the bidding firms costs are correlated. In additional to 
most one-stage auctions he argued for the use of two-stage mechanisms. In the two-stage mechanisms 
one supplier is selected by analyzing all bids with the consumer surplus function. This elects one 
supplier for a second round or bargaining with the procurer.  
 
 
The information feedback given during an auction has a influence on performance. Koppius 
investigated this role of information feedback given during the auction process in a multidimensional 
auction. He described various feedback policies and analyzed the impact on the performance on the 
auction mechanism using the criteria of efficiency and optimality. Results of his laboratory 
experiments learned that an unrestricted information architecture (i.e. more information revealed about 
the state of competition and the bid takers preferences) increases the optimality and efficiency of the 
multidimensional auction. Also auctioning over 4 rounds instead of 2 improves the optimality of the 
auction, but has no overall effect on efficiency. 
 
2.4.2  Measuring performance in a multidimensional auction 
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To analyze the effects of the different auction set-ups on the performance of the auction mechanism, 
criteria is needed by which to judge market performance, as this can be measured in different ways. 
Two measures that are particularly relevant are: 
- Allocative efficiency 
- Pareto optimality 
Pareto optimality in a multidimensional auction is measured at the dyad level of (winning) bidder-bid 
taker. A (winning) bid is Pareto optimal if no feasible bid can be made which is a Pareto improvement, 
i.e. no mutually beneficial bids exist for the bid taker and that particular bidder. This does not 
necessarily mean that the bid takers utility is maximized. Allocative efficiency is achieved when the 
most efficient bidder makes the actual winning bid. In standard one-dimensional auctions, Allocative 
efficiency is achieved when the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction. In the reverse 
auction under consideration here, it means that the bidder with the lowest cost structure wins the 
auction. So a multidimensional auction is efficient if, given a winning bid, there does not exist a 
different bidder who could make a feasible bid (feasible for both parties) that would improve the bid-
takers utility. Loosely speaking, efficiency ensures that the eventual trade occurs between the right 
trading partners, optimality ensures that the total surplus of that trade is maximized. Note that in a 
multidimensional auction, a winning bid can be Pareto optimal, yet at the same time not Allocative 
efficient en vice versa. An optimal, inefficient winning bid can occur when the winning bidder has 
Pareto-optimized his own bid relative to the bid takers utility, yet there may be a different bidder that 
could outbid him (Allocative inefficiency), but that bidder has not made such a bid. A non-Pareto 
optimal, Allocative efficient winning bid can occur when there are no bidders that outbid the current 
highest bidder (Allocative efficient), yet his current bid could be Pareto-improved upon by himself.  
 
Market performance is thus measured by Allocative efficiency and Pareto optimality. In the laboratory 
experiment in this thesis two measures of efficiency are used in analogy to Koppius study: EFF, which 
is a binary variable indicating whether or not the winning bid is efficient and TOTEFF, which indicates 
the distance from the winning bid to the efficient bid. For Pareto optimality, the main measures are 
PARETO and NPARETO. PARETO is a binary variable indicating whether or not the bid is Pareto 
optimal, i.e. whether or not there existed a bid that would have made at least one party better off 
without making the other party worse off. NPARETO is the number of Pareto improving bids that 
existed at the end of the auction. Two additional measures, PARPLUS and NPARETO respectively, 
expect that the requirement is that now both parties have to be strictly better off, i.e. a higher profit for 
the bidder and a higher utility for the bid taker. 
 
2.5 Design of an auction 
 
When we focus on the auction design multiple details are important. Kambil and Van Heck came up 
with the following relevant details: 
• Number of bidders and bid-takers 
• Number of auction able units 
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• Order of offering 
• Stock during auction 
• Length and time of the auction 
• Auction speed 
• Minimum bid and reserve price 
• Ratio fixed costs  total auction price 
• Information architecture  
 
  
3. Auctions in Telecommunications Service offerings 
 
3.1 Auctions in telecommunication services and SLA’s 
 
By telecommunications service offerings are meant actual billable managed services by an operator or 
value added service operator ,as opposed to ,say bandwidth or leased lines , as researched by Chiu, and  
Pau  (1999,2000),etc .. 
 
In addition to the need of standardized contracts , McKnight studied  the use of Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) in the trading of broadband access. He claims that the economic rule of SLAs is 
to lower the transaction costs associated with contracting costs associated with contracting for a 
particular quality of service and to allocate the risks and costs of producing and consuming the service. 
Such contracts are especially important in markets for intangible goods such as communication 
services which present a more complex challenge for trade than do tangible goods.  
 
First, tangible goods are storable which means the production and consumption can be separated in 
time. This often simplifies the evaluation and verification of product attributes and the operation of 
anonymous markets. Second, much of the value of the service contract may be vested in the right (but 
not the obligation) to consume. This creates incentives to statistically aggregate customer demand to 
more efficiently utilize available capacity. Third, the service contract for the exchange of intangible 
goods establish rights over the transaction. These property rights then can be traded and give rise to 
other derivative markets that can help shift risk and allocate costs. Hence, SLAs provide the basis for 
establishing the needed QoS guarantees (i.e. the customer will be provided with a verifiable level of 
service).  
 
When selecting a specific auctioning mechanism multiple merits should be considered. An important 
factor in Mobile messaging auctioning is speed. On the long run trading of mobile messages will take 
place via real-time auctions. So given this real-time character,  speed is quite important. 
 
Another issue next to speed in Mobile messaging auctions , is the price formation. One of the 
objectives of auctioning mobile messaging is price reduction.  
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3.2 Mobile messaging auction experimental designs 
Therefore two experiments have been set-up with two types of multiple-round auctions: 
- One round (first round sealed bid) 
- Five rounds 
The first type stresses the aspect of speed. The second one rather focuses on the optimal price 
formation, and lays a bit closer to the traditional way of todays bilateral negotiating behavior. Hence, 
stimulating the adaptability by the stakeholders. 
 
Combing the variation of number of rounds in the auction and the performance measures (as discussed 
in paragraph 2.4.2) leads to the following hypotheses which were tested and performance evaluated  
 
Hypothesis regarding Allocative Efficiency  
Hypothesis 1 A 5-round auction will improve average efficiency ( EFF5 > EFF1 ) 
Hypothesis 2 The average distance between the winning bid and the efficient bid will be smaller in 
a 5-round auction ( TOTEFF5 < TOTEFF1 ) 
Hypothesis 3 Average Pareto optimality will be larger in a 5-round auction  
( PARETO5 > PERETO1 ) 
 
Hypothesis regarding Pareto Optimality  
Hypothesis 4 The number of Pareto-improving alternatives will be smaller in a 5-round auction ( 
NPARETO5 < NPERETO1 ) 
Hypothesis 5 Average strict Pareto-optimality will be larger in a 5-round auction   
( PARPLUS5  > PARPLUS1 )  
Hypothesis 6 The number of strict Pareto-improving alternatives will be smaller in a 5-round 
auction ( NPARPLUS5 < NPARPLUS1 ) 
 
 
 
3.3 Mobile messaging types 
 
The mobile messaging market currently consists of three types of messaging: 
- Short Messaging Service (SMS) 
- Enhanced Messaging Service (EMS) 
- Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) 
These three types will be discussed separately in the next three sub-paragraphs. In Table 1 the 
evolution of the mobile messaging is summarized. Note that both Short Messaging and Smart 
Messaging are members of the SMS-class. 
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Type Characteristics Content 
Reformatting 
for mobile 
necessary? 
Applications Support Timeframe for 
availability 
Short 
Messaging 
100-200 
characters 
Yes Simple person 
to person 
messaging 
All phones 1990s 
Smart 
Messaging 
Simple 
rudimentary 
images and 
ringtones 
Yes Sending 
pictures and 
ringtones to 
phones 
Some networks 
and Nokia & 
Siemens 
phones only 
1999 onwards 
Enhanced 
Messaging 
Text messages 
plus simple 
media formats 
e.g. sound, 
animation, 
picture, text 
formatting 
enhancements 
Yes Simple person 
to person 
messaging with 
a visual feel 
EMS standards 
expected to be 
widely adopted 
2001 onwards 
Multimedia 
Messaging 
Messages in 
multiple rich 
media formats 
e.g. video, 
audio plus text 
Sometimes Simple person 
to person 
messaging with 
a visual feel 
MMS 
standards 
expected to be 
widely adopted 
2002 onwards 
Table 1: Evolution in mobile messaging 
 
3.3.1 Short Messaging Service 
 
The Short Messaging Service (SMS) is the ability to send and receive text messages to and from 
mobile phones. The text can consist of words or numbers or an alphanumeric combination. SMS was 
created as part of the GSM Phase 1 standard. The first message is believed to be sent in December 
1992 from a personal computer to a mobile phone on the Vodafone network in the UK7. According to 
the Mobile Data Association, over 900 million messages were sent in the UK for the month of January 
alone, a 300% increase on the previous year. 
 
3.3.2 Bulk-SMS 
A large part of the SMS traffic today is accounted for by person-to-person 
communications (chat & text messaging). However, there is an increasing trend 
towards the use of SMS by business users, for both communications and as a 
bearer for delivery of various types of content. For example, Radiolinja reported 
that the number of users of SMS for content services increased from 16 to 24% 
during 2000/2001. This trend has created a demand from the user groups to 
purchase capacity in bulk resulting in the concept of Bulk-SMS. For example, 
in April 2001, Vodafone stated that for its German operation D2, nearly one-third 
of the data revenue, or 5% of the total comes from Bulk-SMS services. 
 15
 3.3.3 Enhanced Messaging Service 
The Enhanced Messaging Service (EMS) is the ability to send ringtones and operator logos and other 
simple visual messages to EMS capable handsets. Additionally, EMS has the ability to send and 
receive a combination of simple media such as melodies, pictures, sounds, animations, modified text 
and standards text as an integrated message for display on an EMS compliant handset. 
 
EMS  is a standard developed by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) to embrace and 
extend the ability to send ringtones and operator logos. There are many different potential 
combinations of these media. For example, when an exclamation mark appears in the enhanced 
message, a melody could be played. A simple black and white image could be displayed along with 
some text and this sound effect. As such, EMS has two main applications: person to person messaging 
and phone personalization8. 
 
 
3.3.4 Multimedia Messaging (MMS) Service  
Multi Messaging Service (MMS) is a cross-industry standard for sending messages between mobile 
phones that can contain an unlimited amount of text. Users can also enhance the emotional content of 
their messages with multimedia content such as pictures, audio and video. Like SMS, MMS messages 
are composed on the phone and sent directly to the receiving phone. From the user's viewpoint, the 
relationship between this new standard and the hugely successful SMS is clear. MMS does everything 
that SMS can plus a lot more besides.  
When it comes to providing MMS services, fundamentally different business models from those 
followed for SMS will be needed. The principal ways in which MMS changes the mobile messaging 
game are that: 
• People will demand content to add to their messages 
• MMS will need to interoperate with other messaging services 
• Messages can vary greatly in size and content 
• There will be a higher emotional attachment to message content 
• Non person-to-person applications will be increasingly important. 
MMS is an IP-based messaging standard, using the application and content standards that pervade the 
Internet. Nevertheless, MMS has been designed by 3GPP, developed and implemented by the mobile 
equipment vendors, with the needs of the mobile network operators primarily in mind.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Buckingham, S., (2001), Success 4 SMS, Mobile Streams, www.mobilestreams.com 
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 3.4 Bulk-SMS business parties  
 
This Section  identifies the stakeholders which either exist or could potentially participate in the 
business of bulk-SMS. The existing and potential market players are identified and their commercial 
and strategic relationships with the others in the value web are identified : 
Figure 3 Bulk-SMS value web 
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Service Provider Mobile Virtual 
Network Operator 
Content 
Developer
Content 
Aggregator 
Network Vendor Gateway ProviderTerminal Vendor 
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8Buckingham, S., (2001), YES 2 EMS, An Introduction to Enhanced Mobile Messaging, Mobile 
Streams, www.mobilestreams.com 
-Buyers 
The units in the bulk-SMS value web, identified as existing or potential buyers of bulk-SMS, are those 
that would use SMS in for example one  of the following areas: Messaging, Mobile commerce, 
Information services, Advertisement Entertainment ,Field Support , Customer relationship 
management, Mobile marketing , Work force management,etc .... 
-Sellers 
All existing and potential wholesalers of SMS, have been included under the following two broad 
categories: Producers & Resellers 
 
• Producers of SMS: They own the SMS Center (SMSC), which they use to sell SMS capacity 
to resellers and users of SMS. Producers of SMS have the advantage of being able to enhance 
their offering with feature like interactivity, alphanumerical sender and user data header, all of 
which are growing in importance. They also have control over the messages being sent and 
received, by operating their own SMSC, placing them in a good position to guarantee service 
delivery. Example, Network Operators and Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) that 
own an SMSC like Vodafone. Producers of SMS in Europe, i.e. network operators and 
MVNOs, have not placed too much emphasis on developing their SMS wholesale business 
due to the hassle and high costs associated with managing the business, hence they would 
prefer to sell to a reseller. 
 
• Resellers of SMS: They do not own an SMSC but access SMS capacity from producers of 
SMS, by owning and operating an SMS Gateway. Their ability to offer enhancements to their 
basic offering, are restricted by the capabilities of the operator whos SMSC they access. 
However, they have the advantage over Producers of SMS of being able to enter into multiple 
operator agreements with multiple operators in different countries, and offer customers the 
convenience of an international packaged solution at a fixed price and the reliability of 
multiple routing options arising from access to several operators SMSCs. 
 
Resellers could be pure or partial resellers. The former plays the role of an intermediary between the 
producers and buyers of bulk-SMS. All the units positioned above them in the value web  could be 
potential customers and all below are competitors, as they not only supply the gateway to access SMS 
capacity but also compete with the producers for the same target users. The latter invest in the SMS 
gateway infrastructure in the first place solely to provide a value addition  to their core business and 
could potentially include any of the units mentioned under buyers of bulk-SMS. Since these units own 
the infrastructure required to access an SMSC, they could potentially also use this to resell to others, 
thereby acting as both customers and competitors to the pure sellers or producers of bulk-SMS. All 
those below could be potential competitors as they not only supply the gateway with SMS capacity but 
also compete with them for the same buyers. Thus, one of the interesting findings from the value web 
analysis is that the same players could be customers of a wholesaler of SMS and potential competitors 
(hybrids), indicating the need to exercise caution when analyzing their behavior in an auction. 
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3.5 Specifications of mobile messaging contracts 
 
In order to start auctioning the mobile messages, an insight into the product specifications is needed. 
First, the SMS contract attributes will be described ,then  the MMS contract attributes. 
 
3.5.1 SMS contract attributes 
 
When trading bulk-SMS several product specifications are being negotiated. The most relevant contract 
attributes are displayed in table two. Here an distinction is made between the variable and fixed 
dimensions. In the bilateral negotiating process being used today to trade bulk-SMS, most of these 
attributes are open to negotiating.  In an  
 
Dimensions Attribute Specification 
Price Range of 0.01 to 0.30 Eurocents/SMS 
Steps of 0.01 Eurocents 
Security level Range of 1 to 3 classes according to 
security standards 
Steps of 1 class 
Variable 
dimensions 
Bulk quantity Min dependant of contract 
Max 2.000.000 
Steps of 100.000 
Size 160 characters 
Delivery delay Default level 
100 ms, 500 ms, 1 s, 5 s, 20 s  
Coverage split X % of population of fixed subscribers 
in country 
Activation period Within 6 hours 
Validation of contract Time to consume, e.g. month/week/day 
Billing reports Provided every week 
Fixed 
dimensions 
Customer support 24 x 7 support desk 
 
T
 
m
r
a
 able 2 : Characteristics of SMS                   Table 2 SMS contract attributesultidimensional auction we want to fix a number of these attributes. The most costs sensitive and 
elevant to negotiating attributes are fixed. In the case of bulk-SMS the attributes price, security level 
nd bulk quantity are left open for negotiating/bidding. 
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Hence, the bidders in the auction not only compete on price, but also on two other variable dimensions 
as security level and bulk quantity. Note, that a buyer can restrict a certain variable dimension, i.e. a 
buyer would like to buy a minimum amount of 700.000 SMSs with any security level. The same buyer 
could valuate larger amounts positively (against a lower price), creating space for competition among 
the suppliers. 
 
 
3.5.2 MMS contract attributes 
 
When trading bulk-MMS the same reasoning as with SMS applies. Likewise several product 
specifications have to be negotiated. The most relevant contract attributes are displayed in table three. 
Here an distinction is made between the variable and fixed dimensions. In the bilateral negotiating 
process being used today to trade bulk-MMS,  
 
Dimensions Attribute Specification 
Price Range of 0.01 to 0.30 Eurocents 
Steps of 0.01 Eurocents 
Size Min 256 characters 
 (check 3GPP standard) 
Max of 10 packets  
Steps of 1 packet  
(128 characters) 
Variable 
dimensions 
Bulk quantity Min dependant of contract 
Max 2.000.000 
Steps of 100.000 
Security level Default class 
 (check 3GPP standard) 
Delivery delay Default level 
100 ms, 500 ms, 1 s, 5 s, 20 s 
Coverage split X % of population of fixed subscribers 
in country 
Activation period Within 6 hours 
Validation of contract Time to consume, e.g. month/week/day 
Billing reports Provided every week 
Fixed 
dimensions 
Costumer support 24 x 7 support desk 
 
Table 3 : Characteristics of MMS 
 
Table 3 MMS contract attributes
 
most of these attributes are open to negotiating.  In a multidimensional auction we want to fix a number 
of these attributes. The most costs sensitive and relevant to negotiating attributes are fixed. In the case 
of bulk-MMS the attributes price, security level and bulk quantity are left open for negotiating/bidding. 
Hence, the bidders in the auction not only compete on price, but also on two other variable dimensions 
as size and bulk quantity. Note, that a buyer can restrict a certain variable dimension, i.e. a buyer would 
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like to buy a minimum amount of 800.000 MMSs with a minimum size of 3 packets. The same buyer 
could value larger amounts positively (against a lower price), creating space for competition among the 
suppliers. 
 
Figure 4 Exchange Processes 
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3.6 Mobile messaging market  
 
Mobile messaging exchanges represent unfamiliar territory for both buyers and sellers of mobile 
messaging capacity. Traditional methods to conduct business transactions are ways of the past. So what 
lies ahead for capacity producers, resellers and hybrids. A good (as described in chapter 3) exchange 
promotes economic efficiency and it provides pricing signals for intelligent business planning. 
Additionally, mobile messaging exchanges can provide stability as well as suitable mechanisms to 
enable financial risk management. The impact for the stakeholders in the mobile messaging market is 
as follows: 
 
• Capacity providers   A capacity builder may want to sell forward contracts on their capacity to 
guarantee a steady stream of revenue. They can also protect themselves against severe price 
drops by the intelligent use of  mobile messaging financial instruments. Selling forwards and 
option contracts allows a capacity provider to bring its network over-capacity on line in a 
financially secured manner. (the proceeds from selling such contracts provides the necessary 
capital as well as demand signal to buy the SMSC). 
• Hybrids   They can anonymously sell excess capacity on the spot market, enabling them to 
offload (quasi-instantaneously, as opposed to months of delay without an exchange 
mechanism) capacity that they would not use. Anonymity gives them protection against 
cannibalization of their branded services, without diluting their market segmentation and 
branding promotional campaigns. They can also purchase certain capacity which is not 
covered by their existing portfolio, to be re-branded to quickly expand their portfolio. 
• Resellers   They can now purchase capacity at the market price without fear of price 
discrimination, particularly for small players. They can concentrate on defining products and 
applications with their knowledge of specific market sand special customer demands. The 
anonymity of the exchange market also allows these resellers to re-brand purchased capacity 
to capture market niche and to promote brand identity. Their increased participation will 
ensure the growth of capacity demand, and thus the growth of the industry. 
• End customers   Participation of more resellers ensures product innovation and price 
competition. Standard economic  theory suggests that increased alternatives will improve 
consumer surplus simply due to enlarged subscriber set and increased competition. 
• Telecommunications industry   An exchange market facilitates multi-lateral and anonymity 
transactions. It also eliminates layers of intermediaries. This efficiency benefits traditional 
players in this industry. Mobile messaging exchanges also encourage the participation of 
many more innovative (and smaller) resellers without fear of being disadvantaged of their 
(small) size. The net result will be an increased number of resellers with the corresponding 
increase in capacity demand. This demand growth will help narrow the current supply-demand 
gap, which could stabilize the falling price of capacity, welcome news for capacity providers. 
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But how can the benefits of the auction be captured? Similar to any commodity markets, appropriate 
risk management tool is required to intelligently participate in such a market. A good risk management 
tool should have the following characteristics: 
 
1. It will incorporate the risk preference of the decision-maker in the planning of messaging 
capacity need and/or capacity building, in the presence of supply-demand uncertainties. 
2. It will use sound financial/economic theory to provide consistent pricing guideline so that 
risk-free profit is not allowed. 
3. It will allow user to dynamically update her portfolio as situation changes. 
4. It will provide data tracking/analysis capability to model the dynamics of the price fluctuation 
process. 
 
Standard financial derivative pricing models (such as the Black-Scholes option pricing formula) are not 
appropriate because of the distinct no-arbitrage principles (unique to telecom capacity), in addition to 
the non-storability nature of mobile messaging capacity. 
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 4 Bulk SMS/MMS mobile messaging reverse auction designs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The parameters and characteristics of the e-auction will be described. Then we will focus even more on 
the behavior of the bidder and bid takers  by describing their utility functions which will simulate their 
costs structure, reflecting  their bidding behavior. Next are described the multi-unit auction and  the 
multiple round auction . Now that most characteristics and parameters of the auction are known, the 
specific design of the auction can be given .. 
 
 
4.2  Characteristics of the mobile messaging auction prototype 
 
In this research project two prototypes were built to analyze the behavior of one bid-taker and four 
bidders in a multiple round reverse SMS and MMS auction. This will represent an average bidding 
process and will give sufficient data to analyze the trading process and to measure the performance of 
the auctions. 
 
The behaviors of the bidder and bid takers are simulated with utility functions. These utility functions 
will simulate the bid takers and bidders costs structure, reflecting  their behavior in the auction. To 
generalize  the results  , we can use utility functions which are strictly conceptual. In the auction we can 
classify the behavior into certain types.  
 
Type Size Quantity 
I > > 
II > < 
III < > 
IV < < 
Table 4: Behavior in MMS auction 
 
The bidders can only bid on the three dimensions, whereby price is  a trade-off is of size and quantity. 
Table 4 represents the behavior in the auction, i.e. type I bidders have a competitive advantage in 
delivering MMSs with large sizes and high quantities resulting in a relative low price in this segment.  
Type Security Quantity 
I > > 
II > < 
III < > 
IV < < 
Table 5:  Behavior in SMS auction 
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 Table 5 represents the same segmentation for the SMS auction. Here the price is a trade-off of security 
and quantity. The bid takers behavior can likewise the behavior of bidders be represented. One bid 
taker can valuate a bid with a low security standard and in large quantities relatively positive, a type III 
bid taker. In the prototype the bidders and bid takers utility curves will be formulated considering these 
conceptual modeling rules. Thus the utility function parameters will be chosen such that each bidder 
has a comparative advantage in a different region of the bid space to partially model a realistic setting 
of bidder heterogeneity.  
 
 
4.3 Utility functions of  bid-taker and bidder 
 
Making a bid in an auction is mainly dependent of the underlying costs structure and valuation of the 
bidder. Equivalent is the selection of the most desired bid by the bid-taker. Therefore utility functions 
of both bid-taker and bidder have to be made. In order to achieve the desired bidder heterogeneity, the 
utility functions will be conceptually modeled as described in the previous paragraph. The three 
dimensions in the SMS auction, namely price, security and quantity are the accountable factors. In the 
MMS auction these dimensions are price, size and quantity. 
 
 
4.3.1Bid-taker utility function 
 
The costs structure of the bid-taker is dependant of the following: 
 
- price contract + provisioning terminals to subscribers 
- amortization terminals during contract 
- fixed service/subscription price (constant) 
 
Revenue elements of the MMS/SMSs are discussed in chapter four, and can be divided into three 
categories:  
- value internal communication 
- value communication to customers 
- value operations 
These categories can demand divergent waging of the three dimensions in their scoring rule. 
 
4.3.2 Bid-taker  SMS utility function 
 
In the SMS trading experiment the number of dimensions is set to 3, more specific price p, security s 
and quantity q, so bsms = (s, q, p).  The constraints regarding feasible bid region are for  both the bid-
taker and all bidders identical: 
(1asms) 1 ≤ security ≤ 3 Classes 
(1asms) 200.000 ≤ quantity ≤ 3.000.000 SMSs 
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(1asms) 1 ≤ price ≤ 30 Eurocent 
Note that the minimum quantity and or security is depended on the minimum quantity of the traded 
contract. 
 
The bid-takers utility functions have the following general form: 
(2sms) U(bsms) = v1e-s + v2e-q - p2 
 
In the prototype several different utility functions are made to evaluate a bid. The parameters v1 en  v2  
will be varied in each auction to model tradeoffs that particular buyer/bid-taker would made between 
security, quantity and price, see table 8. Both v1 en  v2  are values chosen such way, to insure that U(b) 
represents the valuation a bid-taker would make of a specific bid. Furthermore, the formula describes 
the behavior of price, i.e. bids with lower price are ceteris paribus better for the bid-taker. Higher 
quantities or security classes are according to the valuation of the bid-taker, U(b), either valued 
positively or negatively. So one bid-taker could value higher offered quantities and better security class 
positively.  
 
4.3.3 Bid-taker MMS utility function 
 
In the MMS trading experiment the number of dimensions is also set to 3, more specific price p, size s 
and quantity q, so bmms = (s, q, p).  The constraints regarding feasible bid regions are for both the bid-
taker and all bidders identical: 
(1amms) 1 ≤ size ≤ 10 x 128 packets 
(1amms) 200.000 ≤ quantity ≤ 3.000.000 MMSs 
(1amms) 1 ≤ price ≤ 30 Eurocent 
Note that the minimum quantity and/or size is depended of the minimum quantity of the traded 
contract. 
 
The bid-takers utility functions have the following general form: 
(2mms) U(bmms) = v1e-s + v2e-q - p2 
 
In the prototype several different utility functions are made to evaluate a bid. The parameters v1 en  v2  
will be varied in each auction to model tradeoffs that particular buyer/bid-taker would made between 
size, quantity and price, see table 7. Both v1 en  v2  are values chosen such way, to insure that U(b) 
represents the valuation a bid-taker would make of a specific bid. Furthermore, the formula describes 
the behavior of price, i.e. bids with lower price are ceteris paribus better for the bid-taker. Higher 
quantities or sizes are according to the valuation of the bid-taker, U(b), either valued positively or 
negatively. So one bid-taker could value higher offered quantities and better security class positively. 
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4.3.4 Bidders utility function 
 
The bid of the operators is likewise dependent of their costs structure, which is divided into: 
- linear amortization costs of transmission infrastructure 
- operating costs of billing   
o proportional to number of SMS/MMS 
o amortization billing system during time of contract 
- customer support (linked to number of customers) 
- profit margin (proportional to revenue of contract) 
 
Next to the above mentioned costs elements the bid of an operator is also dependent of their network 
load, capacity and sales. The utility functions in the prototype focus only on the three direct 
dimensions. They are in the case of SMS, security, price and quantity , and in the MMS experiment 
size, price and quantity. 
 
The profit (utility) function for bidder i is: 
(3) Ri (s, q, p) = pi - fi (si , qi) 
 
In this profit function, pi indicates the price bid by bidder i and fi (si , qi )  indicates the production costs 
for bidder i of supplying the product with attributes si  and qi .The production cost function has the 
general form: 
(4) fi (si , qi ) = a1,i - a2,isi , - a3,i si 2 - a4,i qi  a5,i qi 2   
 
Each bidder will face different aj,i  to create bidder heterogeneity through different cost functions (e.g. 
the equivalent of private values in standard auctions). The cost function parameters will be chosen such 
that each bidder has a comparative advantage in a different region of the bid space to partially model a 
realistic setting of bidder heterogeneity, see table 7 and 8. For instance, one bidder can have a cost 
advantage on delivering large quantities.  
 
 
4.4 Multi-unit auction 
 
The study of the mobile messaging market in chapter four learned that next to trading sec Bulk-SMS, a 
mix of SMS, EMS and MMS is also traded in one contract. Furthermore, a certain demand of one type 
could be fulfilled by several suppliers. This leads to the field of multi-unit auctions described in 
paragraph 2.4. In the case of a multi-unit reverse auction, multiple bidders can win with identical 
products. The bid-takers demand is fulfilled with products of several bidders. An important restriction 
for such auctions is the similarity of products which have to be inter-changeable and identical. In the 
reverse auction the two methods of price setting, uniform and discriminatory pricing, are still valid.  
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For simplicity reasons and the fact that this research project focuses on trading sec bulk-SMS or bulk-
MMS, the features of a multi-unit auction wont be taken into account and therefore will not be part of 
the prototype. 
  
 
4.5 Multiple round auction 
 
When selecting a specific auctioning mechanism multiple merits should be considered. An important 
factor in this experiment is speed. On the long run trading of mobile messages will take place via real-
time auctions. So given this real-time character, speed is quite important. Another issue next to speed if 
the price formation. One of the objectives of auctioning mobile messaging is price reduction.  
Therefore two experiments will be set-up with two types of multiple-round auctions: 
- One round (first round sealed bid) 
- Five rounds 
The first type stresses the aspect of speed. The second one rather focuses on the optimal price 
formation, and lays a bit closer to the traditional way of todays bilateral negotiating behavior. Hence, 
stimulating the adaptability of the stakeholders. 
 
4.6 Implementation of mobile messaging auction prototype 
 
The multidimensional auction model was implemented in a software prototype built in Commercepack, 
designed to be run over the Internet, needing only a browser on the clients side.It was carried out in 
the Rotterdam Business School e-Auction Laboratory with 6 students and 3 faculty members involved . 
Appendix A shows a screenshot of the bidding screen. The information feedback is shown in Appendix 
B. 
 
 
5. Bulk Mobile messaging auction performance evaluation  
 
 
5.1 Measuring strict utility improvement 
 
The auction performance in this research was  evaluated  on the criteria of Pareto optimality, allocative 
efficiency and auction duration. However, the range of utility values (numerical) prior to auction start, 
based on initial bid inputs, and the final utility values for buyers and bidders based on auction outcome 
is also interesting. This measures the direct effect for the stakeholders of using an auction.  
 
An additional hypothesis is modeled to test the gain in auctioning over the number of rounds. 
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Hypothesis 8  A 5 round auction will improve strict utility ( GAIN5 > GAIN1 ) 
 
In order to test this hypothesis we compared the winning score and initial score, both measured in their 
numerical utility value, in each auction. Table 6 and 7 show the actual gain in utility value for each 
specific auction.  
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I IV 1 2 1 1 -114 -211 97 
II IV 1 4 1 1 -125 -198 73 
I I 1 2 1 2 -41 -154 113
II I 1 2 1 2 -59 -154 95 
I II 1 1 1 1 -106 -189 83 
II II 1 4 1 1 -109 -150 41 
I III 1 2 1 2 -51 -111 60 
II III 1 2 1 1 -52 -91 39 
I II 5 2 4 1 -121 -253 132
II II 5 2 2 2 -144 -346 202
I III 5 4 5 1 -37 -157 120
II III 5 4 3 1 -51 -243 192
I I 5 3 2 2 -51 -124 73 
II I 5 3 2 1 -36 -93 57 
I IV 5 3 1 1 -93 -197 104
II IV 5 3 5 1 -78 -146 68 
I II 5 2 4 1 -121 -285 164
II II 5 2 5 1 -124 -128 4 
I IV 5 2 3 1 -106 -169 63 
II IV 5 2 1 1 -106 -267 161
I I 5 4 4 1 -36 -207 171
II I 5 2 2 1 -41 -165 124
I III 5 4 5 1 -36 -246 210
II III 5 4 1 1 -36 -72 36 
I IV 1 3 1 2 -110 -288 178
II IV 1 3 1 1 -78 -135 57 
I III 1 1 1 1 -31 -51 20 
II III 1 4 1 1 -36 -90 54 
I II 1 3 1 1 -131 -176 45 
II II 1 2 1 1 -123 -149 26 
I I 1 4 1 1 -47 -124 77 
II I 1 2 1 1 -26 -87 61 
Table 6:  Dataset SMS auction experiments 
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I IV 1 2 1 2 -32 -206 174
II IV 1 2 1 1 -19 -152 133
I I 1 2 1 2 98 1 97 
II I 1 2 1 1 108 -14 122
I II 1 2 1 1 -73 -86 13 
II II 1 3 1 0 -86 -91 5 
I III 1 4 1 1 38 -59 97 
II III 1 2 1 1 43 -5 48 
I II 5 1 2 1 -50 -153 103
II II 5 1 1 1 -50 -253 203
I III 5 2 5 1 -17 -268 251
II III 5 2 5 1 -27 -102 75 
I I 5 2 2 2 98 -237 335
II I 5 2 3 1 108 5 103
I IV 5 2 3 1 -17 -193 176
II IV 5 2 1 1 -22 -116 94 
I II 5 1 4 1 -65 -244 179
II II 5 1 1 1 -65 -100 35 
I IV 5 2 1 1 22 -288 310
II IV 5 2 5 2 9 -152 161
I I 5 2 2 1 108 -91 199
II I 5 3 1 0 108 5 103
I III 5 2 3 2 33 -258 291
II III 5 2 1 1 43 -141 184
I IV 1 2 1 2 -17 -120 103
II IV 1 2 1 1 -17 -104 87 
I III 1 4 1 3 28 -12 40 
II III 1 4 1 1 53 3 50 
I II 1 1 1 1 -61 -97 36 
II II 1 1 1 1 -50 -70 20 
I I 1 2 1 2 98 3 95 
II I 1 3 1 1 108 -6 114
Table 7:  Dataset MMS experiments 
 
5.2 Analysis bulk SMS auction experiment 
 
The behavior regarding strict utility improvement of bidder and bid-taker in the SMS experiment was 
analyzed using the method described in Section 2 . Because of the non-normality of the dependent 
variables a non-parametric test is needed for hypothesis eight. The Mann-Whitney test is used to test 
for differences in strict utility improvement. For the tests of hypothesis 8 a p-value of 0,05 was used 
throughout. The SPSS software package was used to perform the statistical analyses. 
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The analysis of the strict utility improvements of the SMS auction in SPSS resulted in tables 8-10. 
 
 
ROUNDS N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
GAIN 1 16 69,94 38,784 9,696
5 16 117,56 62,817 15,704
Valid N 
(listwise)  32 
 Table 8: Descriptive group statistics SMS bulk auction gain (Hypothesis 8) 
 
 
ROUNDS N Mean 
Rank
Sum of 
Ranks
GAIN 1 16 12,75 204,00
5 16 20,25 324,00
Total 32
Table 9: Rank statistics SMS bulk auction gain (Hypothesis 8) 
 
 
  GAIN
Mann-Whitney U 68,000
Wilcoxon W 204,000
Z -2,262
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,024
 Table 10:  Mann-Whitney statistics SMS bulk auction gain (Hypothesis 8)  
 
Table 8 gives the group descriptors for the gain variable in the SMS auction. We see that in a 1 round 
SMS auction strict utility improves with an average of 70. The 5 round auction improves utility with an 
average of 118. Table 9 and 10 show that hypothesis 8 is supported. So a 5-round SMS auction 
significantly improves strict utility. Correspondingly, the average gain between the winning bid and the 
initial bid is smaller in a 5-round SMS auction than in a 1 round auction.  
 
 
5.3 Analysis bulk MMS auction experiment 
 
The MMS experiment analysis is similar to the SMS analysis . Because of the non-normality of the 
dependent variables a non-parametric test is needed for hypothesis eight. The Mann-Whitney test is 
used to test for differences in strict utility improvement. For the tests of hypothesis 8 a p-value of 0,05 
was used throughout. The SPSS software package was used to perform the statistical analyses. 
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The analysis of the strict utility improvements in the bulk MMS auctions in SPSS resulted in tables 11
13 . 
 
 
 
ROUNDS N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
GAIN 1 16 77,13 48,296 12,074
5 16 175,13 88,100 22,025
Valid N 
(listwise)  32 
 Table 11:  Descriptive group statistics of bulk MMS auction gain (Hypothesis 8) 
 
 
ROUNDS N Mean 
Rank
Sum of 
Ranks
GAIN 1 16 11,28 180,50
5 16 21,72 347,50
Total 32
Table 12:  Rank statistics of bulk MMS auction gain (Hypothesis 8) 
 
 
 
  GAIN
Mann-Whitney U 44,500
Wilcoxon W 180,500
Z -3,150
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,002
 Table 13:  Mann-Whitney statistics of bulk MMS auction gain (Hypothesis 8) 
 
Table 11 gives the group descriptors for the gain variable in the MMS auction. We see that in a 1 round 
MMS auction ,the strict utility improves with an average of 77. The 5 round auction improves utility 
with an average of 175. Table 12 and 13 show that hypothesis 8 is supported. So a 5-round MMS 
auction significantly improves the strict utility. Correspondingly, the average gain between the winning 
bid and the initial bid is smaller in a 5-round MMS auction than in a 1 round auction.  
 
5.4 Pareto optimality and allocative efficiency  
 
The results show the following for bulk SMS auctions : 
-Hypothesis 1 and 2 are confirmed in the bulk SMS auction ,so a 5 round SMS auction improves 
average efficiency . Also the average distance between the winning bid and the efficient bid is smaller 
in a 5 round SMS auction than in a 1 round auction 
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-Hypotheses 3 to 6 are not confirmed in an bulk SMS auction  .The average Pareto optimality is very 
high ,maybe because of the weight to the security attribute .Therefore most winning bids had the 
optimum security offer , reducing the Pareto improving bids . 
-Hypothesis 7 is supported in the bulk SMS auction ,meaning that a 1 round auction is significantly 
faster (33 seconds) than a 5 round action (168 seconds)  
 
The results also show the following for bulk MMS auctions : 
-Hypothesis 1 and 2 are confirmed in the bulk MMS auction ,so a 5 round MMS auction improves 
average efficiency ; correspondingly the average distance between the winning bid is smaller in a 5 
round MMS auction than in a 1 round auction 
-All of hypotheses 3 to 6 are confirmed in the bulk MMS auction,and auctioning over more rounds 
significantly improves the Pareto optimality in the MMS auction 
-Hypothesis 7 is confirmed ,and the 1 round auction only lasts 26 s compared to 172 s for the 5 round 
MMS auction 
- 
  
 
5.5 Relevance of the  hypotheses 
 
Statistical analysis of the 8 hypothesis outcomes gave more general insight in the use of auctions in the 
field of mobile messaging. However, some of these hypotheses are different in relevance towards the 
seller and buyer. Therefore, we rank these hypothesis as to domain relevance for respectively buyer and 
bidders in their respective business domains. So to interpret the experimental outcomes, we first 
interpret them without business domain priorities, and next with business domain priorities. 
 
The theoretical analysis in Section  2 showed that in a reverse auction ,  information about the supply-
side gives the bidder information about the state of competition among the bidders. When this type of 
information is more available, the more transparent the competition process becomes and the more 
likely it  is that the most efficient bidder will actually win the auction. This performance is measured as 
allocative efficiency. The experiment learned that , both in the SMS and the MMS auctions,  auctioning 
over more rounds improved the allocative efficiency. The measures of allocative efficiency is most 
important to the buyer. When the auction wouldnt encourage efficient behavior, the auction could be 
won by another party than the one with the lowest cost price. This means that the trade isnt made 
among the right parties. 
 
Information about the demand-side gives the bidder information about the bid-takers preferences. More 
precisely, about the direction in which to improve his bid. The more this type of information is 
available, the more fully known the bid-takers preferences and the more likely that opportunities for 
win-win improvements will be exploited. This type of performance is measured as Pareto optimality. 
Hypotheses 3,4,5 and 6 tested and verified  these assumptions. Pareto optimality is relevant for both 
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bidders and bid-takers. When the auction is Pareto optimal the total surplus of the trade is maximized 
for both parties. 
 
Next to the performance in terms of Pareto optimality and allocative efficiency the range of utility 
values (numerical) prior to auction start, based on initial bid inputs, and the final utility values for 
buyers and bidders based on auction outcome is also interesting. This measures the direct effect for the 
stakeholders of using an auction. We showed that auctioning over 5 rounds instead of 1 round improves 
the strict utility in the SMS and MMS auctions. 
 
6 Future scenarios in trading bulk mobile messaging 
 
Considering the reverse single -sided auction of bulk mobile messages , the impact of the above results 
for the stakeholders in the mobile messaging area are as follows : 
-Mobile network operators : they can sell excess capacity enabling them to offload to new customers 
rather fast , as opposed to weeks of delay without an auctioning mechanism .They can also purchase 
certain capacity that is not covered by their existing portofolio to be re-branded quickly 
-Virtual mobile network operators : can sell excess or buy capacity as well; furthermore they may even 
buy the capacity from other parties than their key infrastructure supplier ,and by adopting auctioning 
early they may win customers faster than the mobile operators .  
-Users of bulk messaging : they can now purchase capacity at the best market price without fears of 
discrimination or dependencies , particularly for small users .Furthermore the users of bulk messaging 
can concentrate on the requirements from their specific field of use , in addition to driving the bi-lateral 
negotiations .Their increased participation will ensure the growth towards critical mass  
-For all : the possibility to enter private utility functions reflecting the strategy or capabilities or needs 
of that stakeholder  
 
This paper did not consider the case where a trusted third party would carry out the auctions, thus 
adding e.g. anonymity to the bidding process. The reasons is that suppliers still have ,under SLA terms, 
to guarantee some quality of service features and to ensure technical interoperability , aspects not done 
efficiently by a third party focussing on auctioning .  
  
Also, although this paper is only a first step towards real time e-auctions of bulk mobile messaging , 
some clues have been produced. It has been determined that a mobile messaging auction should take 
place in a multidimensional setting in order to make it interesting for all parties .Secondly such 
auctions should be run over 5 rounds instead of one round , in view of much better Pareto optimality 
and allocative efficiency . Nevertheless , the multiple rounds do not seem a major obstacle to 
optimizing the auction implementations towards execution times in the second range . 
 
Further research will be conducted on : 
-combinations of more or other bulk messaging attributes ,and the adaptability of auctioning on these 
attributes 
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-use of a risk management tool incorporating the risk preference of the buyer in the planning of 
messaging capacity need or build-up , in the presence of supply-demand uncertainties ;it should also 
allow users to update their portofolio as situations change ,and give some tracking/analysis dynamics  
-comparison between auction derived prices and prices in the market otherwise 
-possibly extending the bulk MMS auction to include limited content provisioning bundles  
-optimize the execution for speed performance , in line with what has been done Pau (1999) on 
bandwidth trading   
-further work on the automated SLA negotiation (has started in collaboration with the Open Group 
Task force on QoS )  
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